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1955] RECENT DECISIONS 749 
CORPORATIONS-RECLASSIFICATION OF SECURITIES AS A PURCHASE UNDER 
SECTION I6(n) OF THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE Acr-Plaintiff, a minority 
stockholder in the Old Town Corporation, brought action on behalf of the 
corporation to recover alleged "shortswing" profits made by defendants, who 
were officers, directors and large shareholders of Old Town, on the sale of 45.9 
percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation. The corporation had, with 
the approval of 78 percent of the owners in interest, reclassified the 320,402 out-
standing shares of $5 par common stock as 320,402 shares of $1 par common 
and 320,402 shares of 40¢ cumulative preferred stock of $7 par value. This 
reclassification was done for the frank purpose of increasing the market value and 
salability of defendants' interest so that the defendants could sell their holdings. 
Within six months of the reclassification defendants sold both the new common 
stock and the preferred stock. Held, the reclassification was not a purchase so 
as to bring it within the scope of section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
750 MmmcAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
Act of 1934.1 Roberts v. Eaton, (2d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 348 
U.S. 827, 75 S.Ct. 44 (1954). 
Section 16(b) permits recovery by the issuer, or by any stockholder if the 
corporation refuses to take action, of the profits made by an insider from any 
"purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase ... of such issuer ... within any 
period of less than six months. . . ."2 A purchase is "any contract to buy, pur-
chase or otherwise acquire. . . ."3 An "insider" under the act is an officer, direc-
tor or direct or indirect beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any equity 
security of a listed corporation.4 Section 16(b) has been consistently inter-
preted according to the purpose of the act rather than its literal implication. 
The purpose is to protect the "outside" stockholders from any possible detri-
mental use of the superior position of the "insiders."5 The principal case appears 
to set three requirements for the "immunization" of a transaction resulting in the 
acquisition of securities: (I) no change in the total ownership interest of the 
stockholder, (2) no possibility of abuse of inside information, and (3) no option 
on the part of the individual stockholder to refuse the new securities. The court 
did not find any change in interest in the extinction of the old common and the 
issuance of the two new series of stock.6 It-also distinguished the principal case 
from previous cases7 in which the acquired securities were of a pre-existing class, 
were publicly held, and had an independent value in a pre-existing market. 
The only other instance of a change in the form of proprietary interest to be 
held not a purchase or sale occurred where an exchange of shares with a wholly 
owned subsidiary was held to be a mere transfer from one corporate pocket to 
another.8 This requirement of a change in substance as well as form seems to 
settle a question raised by dictum in Park & Tilford v. Schulte,9 where it was 
said that there had been a purchase because "defendants did not own the com· 
mon stock before they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward.'110 
In the principal case, Park & Tilford was distinguished as resting upon the vol-
untary actions of that defendant in converting his preferred stock for common. 
The court found no such option to be present in this case since the corporation 
143 Stat. L. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78p(b). 
2 Ibid. 
3 48 Stat. L. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78c(l3). 
448 Stat. L. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78p(a). 
6 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 231, cert. den. 320 U.S. 
751, 64 S.Ct. 56 (1943); Shaw v. Dreyfus, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 140, cert. den. 
337 U.S. 907, 69 S.Ct. 1048 (1949); Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 564 (1951). 
6 " ••• any change in value due to the split or reclassification of stock comes sub-
stantially from the actual or expected tastes and preferences of the public for particular 
types and forms of securities; and values due to company prospects or plans will be re-
flected in the ordinary market value of the original stock." Principal case at 85. 
7 Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, (2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 984, cert. den. 332 
U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 64 (1947); Blau v. Hodgkinson, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 361; 
Truncale v. Blumberg, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 387; Blau v. Mission Corp., (2d Cir. 
1954) 212 F. (2d) 77, cert. den. 347 U.S. 1016, 74 S.Ct. 872 (1954). 
s Blau v. Mission Corp., note 7 supra. 
9 (2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 984, cert. den. 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 64 (1947). 
10160 F. (2d) 984 at 987. 
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had effected a statutory reclassification and there was no provision for minority 
stockholders to accept cash for their old holdings. It was not regarded as sig-
nificant that effective control, though not an absolute majority control, was in 
the hands of defendants and that they had, therefore, a real choice in the mat-
ter.11 Nor was it deemed determinative that the reclassification was made for 
the benefit of the individual defendants rather than the corporation. In giving 
what appears to be undue emphasis to the corporate fiction, the holding of the 
court may be open to attack on three grounds. First, the individual stockholder's 
rights as owner of a share of preferred and a share of $1 common are not the 
same as they were when he held only the $5 common. As the owner of both 
types he is in a position to alienate completely certain of his interests in the 
corporation, while retaining the rest, or he could sell both issues to separate 
parties for a higher total sale price than he could have received for the sale of 
the old $5 common.12 Secondly, the advance knowledge of the future actions 
of a corporation in regard to its stock gives rise to the possibility of just those 
abuses which the act was designed to stop. In the principal case there is no 
serious contention of abusive use of the information, but because the defendants 
by their position as directors, officers and large stockholders did know in advance 
of, and in fact initiated, the reclassification, they did have that opportunity.13 
Finally, even if it is valid to distinguish cases on the basis of an option on the 
part of the stockholder to take the new security which he has received or is 
about to receive, nevertheless it should not be applied to cases where the insider 
has such effective control over the issuer that his decision is in effect the corpo-
rate decision. 
Eric E. Bergsten 
11 Compare Park & Tilford, note 7 supra, at 988 with Shaw v. Dreyfus, note 5 supra. 
Note also Judge Clark's dissenting opinion in the latter case. 
12 Cf. note 6 supra. 
13 See the dissent in Shaw v. Dreyfus, note 5 supra. Worth noting is the fact that a 
reclassification might be deemed a sale though not a purchase. Had the defendants in the 
principal case, knowing that the change in the capital structure would give rise to a per-
manent increase in the market value of the security involved, purchased additional out-
standing stock before this information was made public and within six months prior to 
the reclassification, the result might well have been different. 
